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Fragmenting Procreation
In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Ct. App. 1998), review
denied, No. S069696, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3830 (June 10, 1998).
In recent years society has developed a range of novel technological
and legal means to help people overcome infertility and the inability to
gestate. As a result, the components of procreation have become
increasingly fragmented: The role of "mother" no longer necessarily refers
to a woman who both provides the ovum for a child and gestates her, and
the role of "father" no longer necessarily refers to a man who provides
sperm.' As it becomes increasingly possible to assign the different
procreative roles to different individuals, legislatures and courts find
themselves facing new questions of how to value those components,
particularly when the parties assign procreative roles in a manner that poses
hitherto unimagined conflicts.
In March 1998, California's Fourth District Court of Appeal handed
down a widely noted2 opinion in which it ruled that a father who consented
to a surrogacy arrangement with a gestational surrogate,3 using
anonymously donated sperm and eggs, could not evade financial
responsibility for supporting the resulting child simply because he had no
1. See, e.g., John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of
Biology as a Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 353-54 (1991); Dale Elizabeth
Lawrence, Surrogacy in California: Genetic and Gestational Rights, 21 GoLDEN GATE U. L.
REV. 525, 528 (1991); Anne Reichman Schiff, Solomonic Decisions in Egg Donation:
Unscrambling the Conundrum of Legal Maternity, 80 IOWA L. REv. 265, 265 (1995); Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for
Greater Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 299. See generally Todd M. Krim, Beyond Baby M:
International Perspectives on Gestational Surrogacy and the Demise of the Unitary Biological
Mother, 5 ANNALS HEALTH L. 193 (1996) (discussing the fragmentation of parental roles in new
procreative arrangements).
2. See, e.g., New Clarity in Surrogacy Cases, Editorial, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1998, at B8
(lauding the court for "holding a father's feet to the fire" and "look[ing beyond biology in the
establishment of the rights and obligations of parents"). The CBS television show, 48 Hours,
featured a story about the court decision and the events that led to this case, although the
program's influence may have been limited by the fact that it originally aired opposite the final
episode of Seinfeld. See Steve Carney, '48 Hours' Will Feature Costa Mesa Girl, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 10, 1998, atB3.
3. A gestational surrogate is a woman who agrees to gestate a baby for an infertile couple by
having an embryo implanted in her uterus and thus has no genetic relationship to the child she
bears. A "traditional" surrogate is a woman who is artificially inseminated with the sperm of the
husband of an infertile couple and who thus contributes half of the baby's genetic matter.
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biological relationship to her.4 In this case of first impression, the court held
that although neither intended parent had any genetic or gestational
relationship to the child, their procreative intent established them as the
child's legal parents.'
Faced with a situation in which both the surrogate mother and the
intending father disclaimed responsibility for a child, the court was right to
impose responsibility on the father, who, unlike the surrogate, had obligated
himself to become a legal parent of the child. The ruling is problematic,
however, for two reasons. First, the court used a statute that was by it terms
intended to apply to artificial insemination, not to surrogacy arrangements.
Second, the ruling could lead to the undervaluation of the gestational role of
surrogates in custody battles that are likely to arise in the future.
I
John and Luanne Buzzanca wished to have a child but were unable to
do so via conventional means. Instead, the couple obtained the sperm and
eggs of anonymous donors, fertilized an embryo in vitro, and implanted it
in the uterus of a woman who had agreed to serve as a surrogate.
Approximately one month before the child was born, Mr. Buzzanca
initiated proceedings to terminate the Buzzancas' marriage. In his petition,
he alleged that the couple had no children. In Ms. Buzzanca's response
papers, she alleged that the couple was expecting a child by way of
surrogacy contract, and argued that Mr. Buzzanca should be held
responsible for providing support to the child as the legal father. Jaycee
Buzzanca was born six days later, and the surrogate and her husband did
not seek to become Jaycee's lawful parents. At an oral hearing to determine
the parenthood of Jaycee and the support, if any, owed by Mr. Buzzanca,
the trial court ruled that the child was a legal orphan.6
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that because the Buzzancas had
initiated the arrangement that resulted in Jaycee's birth, they were the
lawful parents, and each was to contribute to Jaycee's support. The court
ruled that Ms. Buzzanca was similarly situated to a husband in an artificial
insemination case,7 because although she had no genetic relationship to the
4. See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 293-94 (Ct. App. 1998), review
denied, No. S069696, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 3830 (June 10, 1998).
5. See id. at 282.
6. The trial judge ruled that Luanne Buzzanca could not be the legal mother of the child,
since she neither gestated the child nor was genetically related to her. Further, the judge held, John
Buzzanca could not be the legal father, because he also was genetically unrelated to the child and
his intent to enter into a surrogacy arrangement was insufficient to establish him as the father of a
child not born to his wife. See id. at 282-84.
7. Artificial insemination here describes an arrangement whereby the wife of an infertile
couple is inseminated with sperm from an anonymous donor. Ms. Buzzanca was said to have been
situated similarly to a husband in such an arrangement because, like the husband who becomes a
1894 [Vol. 108: 1893
1999] Case Note 1895
child, her consent initiated the medical procedure that resulted in the
gestation and birth of the child. Since California law holds that a husband
who consents to the artificial insemination of his wife is deemed the lawful
father of the genetically unrelated child,' the court reasoned, intent should
also be sufficient to award motherhood to the wife in a gestational
surrogacy situation in which both the sperm and the ova are obtained from
anonymous donors.9 As for Mr. Buzzanca, the court ruled that the principle
of estoppel-as manifested by the artificial insemination statute-prevented
him from disclaiming responsibility for Jaycee since his consent had
initiated the surrogacy arrangement that was responsible for Jaycee's life."0
In sum, the court concluded that "a husband and wife [should] be deemed
the lawful parents of a child after a surrogate bears a biologically unrelated
child on their behalf."11
II
While the procreative arrangement the Buzzancas used may seem
unusual, there are many reasons to believe that American courts will be
asked to rule on parental rights in such situations with increasing
frequency." Nevertheless, although the number and complexity of
surrogacy cases have grown tremendously since the early 1980s, 13 states
have not enacted laws that adequately define the parental relationships of
the individuals who enter into gestational surrogacy agreements, 4 and no
legal father to a biologically unrelated child by consenting to artificial insemination, Ms.
Buzzanca consented to the gestational surrogacy arrangement that resulted in Jaycee's birth.
8. See CAL. FAMi. CODE § 7613 (West 1994). The statute reads:
(a) If,... with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen
donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the
natural father of a child thereby conceived....
(b) The donor of semen provided.., for use in artificial insemination of a woman other
than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child
thereby conceived.
9. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288-89.
10. See id. at 286-88.
11. Id. at 282.
12. The Buzzanca court itself recognized that "[e~ven if all means of artificial reproduction
were outlawed with draconian criminal penalties .... courts will still be called upon to decide
who the lawful parents really are .... These cases will not go away." Id. at 293.
13. See, e.g., Jerald V. Hale, Note, From Baby M. to Jaycee B.: Fathers, Mothers, and
Children in the Brave New World, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 335, 345 (1998) (describing the effect on
courts of the increase in gestational surrogacy arrangements); see also Lori B. Andrews,
Surrogacy Wars: Slavery or Blessing?, CAL. LAW., Oct. 1992 at 43, 48-49 (providing a brief
history of surrogacy cases in the United States); Davan Maharaj, What Makes a Parent? Courts
Often Decide Family, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1998, at Al (" 'Whatever the curbs, people are going
to use these technologies to fulfill their desires to have children."' (quoting Lee M. Silver)).
14. See, e.g., Hale, supra note 13, at 372 ("[Mhe patchwork of state statutory law is grossly
insufficient in regard to [assisted reproductive technologies], especially in the area of gestational
surrogacy."); Alice Hofheimer, Note, Gestational Surrogacy: Unsettling State Parentage Law
and Surrogacy Policy, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 571 (1992) (explaining that most
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state has yet enacted a law addressing the legal status of persons like the
Buzzancas. Thus, courts faced with such questions must look either to
statutes that were never intended to cover the situation at hand or to the
rulings of other courts that have adjudicated these issues. California leads
the world in surrogacy litigation; ' its judicial decisions are likely to have a
far-reaching impact throughout the nation.
The Buzzanca case was atypical of surrogacy litigation because only
one of the participants wanted to be judicially declared the child's legal
parent; all others actively sought to avoid that status. By contrast, in the
typical surrogacy case, conflict arises because two parties wish to be named
parents of the child, each to the exclusion of the other. 6 The ruling
achieved a just result: Jaycee Buzzanca will receive support payments from
Mr. Buzzanca, whose consent triggered the complex arrangement that
resulted in her birth, and Mr. Buzzanca will not be permitted to renege on
these responsibilities. But Buzzanca was a case of first impression, and its
ruling has already been understood to stand for the much broader
proposition that the original intention of the parties, expressed in a
surrogacy contract, should govern a court's determination of parenthood in
a situation in which neither intending parent nor the surrogate is genetically
related to the child. 7 For those who believe that gestating even a
genetically unrelated child vests a woman with inalienable parenthood
rights, the selection of original procreative intent as the method of breaking
the genetic "draw" is troubling, since it will be only a matter of time before
a court is faced with a case in which a genetically unrelated gestational
surrogate wishes to assert a parenthood claim against an intending couple
who are also genetically unrelated. 8
state laws do not address whom to assign motherhood when one woman provides the ovum, the
other gestates and births the child, and both attempt to claim motherhood).
15. See Lawrence, supra note 1, at 541 n.94 (estimating that from 1981 to 1991, California
was home to approximately half of the nation's known surrogacy cases); Robert L. Wahnsley,
Surrogacy: Present and Future, ORANGE COUNTY LAW., Sept. 1998, at 36 (stating that California
is the "surrogacy capital of the world").
16. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227
(N.J. 1988).
17. The statute books themselves now reflect this understanding. See CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 7613 ann.8 (West Supp. 1999) (citing Buzzanca for the proposition that "[w]here husband and
wife contracted for surrogate to be implanted with embryo which consisted of egg and sperm from
unidentified persons, wife, not surrogate or donor of egg, was lawful mother of child, pursuant to
intent in surrogacy contract"). Several commentators share this understanding. See Maharaj,
supra note 13 (reporting that the Buzzanca court held that "you are a parent if you sign a contract
that brings a child into the world"); Mark Momjian, Surrogacy Agreements Pose Biotech
Quandary for Courts, NAT'L L.J., May 11, 1998, at B7 ("Buzzanca advocates an intentional
theory of parenthood-intent to parent outweighs status-based biological ties in cases in which
one woman's egg is gestated in another's womb....").
18. See Krim, supra note 1, at 194.
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One way to understand the principles the California courts articulated
in Buzzanca and its predecessor cases is to think of the possible procreative
relationships as "contacts" to the unborn child. One might identify four
prenatal contacts to a child: (1) male genetic contribution; (2) female
genetic contribution; (3) original procreative intent (the intentions of all
parties at the time the arrangement was made); and (4) gestation of the
child. 9 These four contacts need not be assigned equal weight. Original
procreative intent, for example, is quite distinct as a "contact" from the
three biological factors, since intent is, at the outset, responsible for
aligning the biological factors in such a manner as to create life. There
should, however, be a strong presumption that the male and female genetic
contributions deserve equal weight.2"
To conclude that Ms. Buzzanca was Jaycee's legal mother, the Court of
Appeal took a statute that, by its terms, was intended to apply only to
husbands in artificial insemination cases2' and stretched it to apply as well
to the initiating woman in a surrogacy case. The court based its ruling on
Johnson v. Calvert, in which the California Supreme Court used the same
statute to hold that where a husband and wife fertilized their own sperm and
egg in vitro and then implanted the zygote into the womb of a gestational
surrogate, the surrogate had no valid claim of parenthood. 2
But the scenario to which the artificial insemination statute was meait
to apply is quite distinct from the situation in Johnson, and it is even more
distinct from the situation in Buzzanca. In an artificial insemination
scenario, a donor's sperm is injected into the intending mother, and thus the
intending couple is responsible for one-half of the child's genetic makeup,
the gestation of the child, and the original procreative intent. In Johnson,
the intending couple also possessed three procreative "contacts" to the
child, but they were different contacts: The intending couple in Johnson
provided both the male and female genetic contribution, and their intent
was responsible for the arrangement, but it was the surrogate who gestated
the child. In Buzzanca, the situation was even further removed from the
situation to which the artificial insemination statute was intended to apply,
since neither the surrogate nor either intending parent contributed any
19. Cf., e.g., Andrea E. Stumpf, Note, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix for New
Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE LJ. 187, 193 (1986) (describing four "stages" in the
procreative process in the surrogate motherhood context: "child initiating," "preparation,"
"gestation," and "child raising"). Stumpf does not discuss an arrangement in which the surrogate
mother does not make any genetic contribution to the child.
20. Each contribution is responsible for half of the child's genetic makeup, so each arguably
creates an equally strong expectation of parenthood.
21. See supra note 8.
22. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776,778-79 (Cal. 1993).
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genetic material to the child (creating a genetic "draw"), and the
procreative intent and gestation contacts were split between the Buzzancas
and the surrogate. Thus, simply appealing to the artificial insemination
statute as a legislative statement that intent should govern complex
procreative arrangements, as the Buzzanca court did,' may misconstrue
legislative intent, since the California legislature may have intended to
assign parentage to intending couples only in situations in which a genetic
"draw" was broken by the fact that both the intent and the gestation
contacts favored the intending couple. The artificial insemination statute, in
other words, tells us little about whether the California legislature would
enable procreative intent or the gestational role of a surrogate to determine
which of two individuals in a genetic draw should be granted custody. 4
The court also erred by discounting the relevance of In re Marriage of
Moschetta, a case it decided only four years earlier. In Moschetta, the court
held that a "traditional" surrogacy contract could not be enforced by a
sperm-contributing husband as against a surrogate who contributed her ova
and gestated the child.25 The Buzzanca court claimed that Moschetta was
inapplicable to the facts before it because the surrogate in Moschetta had a
genetic relationship to the child, and the intending mother in that case had
relinquished her rights to the child-only the intending father sought
custody. But examining Moschetta under a "contact" analysis reveals
similarities to Buzzanca. The important point is that Moschetta, like
Buzzanca, involved a genetic "draw"; in the former case, the father and
surrogate each contributed half of the child's genes, and in the latter, neither
the father nor the surrogate made any genetic contribution. In Moschetta,
the court chose to place gestation on at least an even par with intent,
holding that both the intending father and the surrogate were legal parents
to the child. To be sure, the Buzzanca court could not have made a similar
determination, since the surrogate in Buzzanca had eschewed any claim of
motherhood. But its choice may carry weight for a court that must decide
"Buzzanca II"-a case in which a gestational surrogate, who is genetically
unrelated to the child, attempts to assert parenthood in opposition to one or
both parties comprising the intending couple, who are also genetically
unrelated to the child.
• 23. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 288 ("The statute contemplates the establishment of lawful
fatherhood in a situation where an intended father has no biological relationship to a child who is
procreated as a result of the father's (as well as the mother's) consent to a medical procedure.").
24. The statute was adopted from the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act, whose commentary
states:
This Act does not deal with many complex and serious legal problems raised by the
practice of artificial insemination. It was thought useful, however, to single out and
cover in this Act at least one fact situation that occurs frequently. Further consideration
of other legal aspects of artificial insemination... is recommended to state legislators.
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5 cmt., 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987).
25. In re Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 894-95 (Ct. App. 1994).
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TABLE. "CONTACT ANALYSIS" OF CALIFORNIA SURROGACY
__GENETICj O~ INTENT GESTATION PREVAILING PARTY
CONTRIBUTION
ARTIFICIAL Intending Mother Intending Intending Intending Couple
INSEMINATION Sperm Donor Couple Mother (genetic " draw," but couple
STATUTE has both intent and gestation)
JOHNSON Intending Mother Intending Surrogate Intending Couple
Intending Father Couple (100% of genes and intent:
gestation cannot overcome)
MOSCHETA Surrogate Intending Surrogate Surrogate/Intending Father
Intending Father Couple (genetic "draw"; gestation
and intent on equal par)
BJZZANCA Egg Donor Intending Surrogate Intending Couple
Sperm Donor Couple (genetic "draw"; surrogate
does not assert claim; intent
deemed legally compelling)
BUZZNCA H Egg Donor Intending Surrogate Unknown
Sperm Donor Couple (genetic "draw"; will intent
be deemed more legally
significant than gestation?)
IV
If the broad principles articulated in Buzzanca are taken literally-as
indeed they have been so far26-- they will lead a future court considering
"Buzzanca IF' to rule in favor of the intending parents. This result would
fail to take into account powerful reasons to privilege the gestational
relationship. Those reasons become vastly more compelling when the
surrogate is the only potential parent who has any biological connection to
the child. A court considering "Buzzanca IT' should take into account that
"a woman, even one who has given birth in the past, may not be able to
predict her emotional state when the child she has agreed to surrender is
born pursuant to the surrogate parenting agreement." 27 This view does not
reflect a paternalistic understanding of a woman's ability to make credible
commitments, but rather the position that certain kinds of agreements ought
to be breachable, because requiring that they be kept would threaten the
personal integrity of the promisor.' The gestational relationship is sui
26. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
27. Barbara L. Atwell, Surrogacy andAdoption: A Case of Incompatibility, 20 COLUM. HuM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 37 (1988); see also Nicole Miller Healy, Beyond Surrogacy: Gestational
Parenting Agreements Under California Law, 1 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 89, 113 & n.102 (1991)
("If women are truly unable to predict the strength of the maternal bond, they may be unable to
give their informed consent, and the contract would be void from its inception.").
28. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 774-
86 (1983). Some scholars have argued that society ought not to commodify women's bodies or
reproductive services because to do so would lead some women to enter into agreements that
might compromise their personhood. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1903 (1987). Many who oppose surrogacy altogether question whether most
women who choose to become surrogates do so voluntarily. See, e.g., THOMAS A. SHANNON,
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generis,29 and ought not to be subjected to a standard contract-law analysis
that might privilege the original intent of the parties to an agreement.
Many argue, to the contrary, that intent-based principles serve the best
interests of children by laying out bright-line rules that portend stability in
the early placement of children by discouraging protracted litigation and
limiting the extent to which children may spend their young lives as the
objects of dispute, acrimony, and ever-shifting custody placements." The
benefits of certainty, however, could be realized under any bright-line rule
regime that awarded sole custody, even one that presumptively awarded
sole custody to the surrogate if she were to change her mind within a certain
number of weeks after the birth of the child.31
The Buzzanca court-which was not faced with resolving the
competing claims of a surrogate and an intending couple-did not have to
take into account the importance of gestation. It properly relied on intent to
hold Mr. Buzzanca responsible for the consequences of his having
consented to the arrangement. The court ought not, however, to have
painted with such broad strokes. The Buzzanca court did not understand
itself to be creating a rule that would apply to cases in which the surrogate
mother and the intended mother both sought to become the child's legal
mother.32 But in the course of assigning support responsibilities, the court
did assign parentage, and it did so purely on the basis of procreative
intent.33 By explicitly narrowing the use of intent to situations in which the
surrogate does not assert any parenthood interest, the Court of Appeal could
have avoided setting a precedent that may fail to take into account the
complexity and the importance of the gestational relationship.
-Jonathan B. Pitt
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HUMAN BEINGS 61-65 (1988).
29. The medical literature recognizes the biological and emotional role gestation plays in
determining the characteristics of the child and the quality of the mother-child relationship. See,
e.g., Hill, supra note 1, at 397 (stating that prenatal bonding between mother and child "is
supported by a great deal of evidence, both scientific and anecdotal"); R. Brian Oxman,
Maternal-Fetal Relationships and Nongenetic Surrogates, 33 JuRIMETRICS J. 387, 424 (1993);
see also ROBIN Fox, REPRODUCTION AND SUCCESSION: STUDIES IN ANTHROPOLOGY, LAW, AND
SocImY 71-79 (1993) (discussing the mother-child "bonding" that occurs during gestation).
30. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 1, at 555 (explaining that the intent-based decision in
Johnson was "an attempt to eliminate confusion and uncertainty in the child's life"); Shultz,
supra note 1, at 302-03 (arguing that intent should govern courts' custody decisions in new
reproductive technology scenarios); Lee M. Silver & Susan Remis Silver, Confused Heritage and
the Absurdity of Genetic Ownership, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 593, 611 (1998) (" [I]n determining
legal parenthood, a court should look to the intent of the parties when they consented to the
reproductive procedures that resulted in the birth of a child.").
31. It bears noting that such a regime likely would have the additional effect of reducing the
number of surrogacy arrangements, since such contracts would not be fully enforceable.
32. See Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 289 ("This case is not about 'transferring' parenthood
pursuant to [surrogacy] agreements.").
33. See id., at 290-91 (holding that intent is the "best rule to promote certainty and stability
for the child" and describing the intending parents as "prime movers" (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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